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Abstract 
This paper analyses predictions of a simple model of currency crises in which the peg will be 
abandoned when the currency overvaluation hits a certain threshold, unknown to the agents. 
Due to learning about the threshold, some features usually observed in the data and identified 
with models with multiple equilibria arise in the model. But the model yields distinctive 
predictions about the behaviour of the probability and the expected magnitude of a currency 
devaluation. The paper identifies the probability and expected magnitude of a devaluation of 
Brazilian Real in the period leading up to the end of the Brazilian pegged exchange rate 
regime, using data on exchange rate options. The empirical results are consistent with model 
predictions. 
 
Keywords:  Currency crises, exchange rate, options, probability of devaluation, devaluation 
size 
JEL Classification:  F3 
 
 
This paper was produced as part of the Centre’s Macro Programme.  The Centre for 




This paper is partly based on Chapter 2 of my PhD dissertation at Yale University. I am very 
grateful to Stephen Morris, my advisor, for his guidance. I also thank Fernando Broner, 
Francesco Caselli, Jaume Ventura and several seminar participants for their comments, 
BM&F for the data and Nathan Foley-Fisher for superb research assistance financed by 
STICERD. 
  Bernardo Guimaraes is an Associate of the Macro Programme at the Centre for 







Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
 
All rights reserved.  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval 
system or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of 
the publisher nor be issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it 
is published. 
 
Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be sent 
to the editor at the above address. 
 
© B. Guimaraes, submitted 2008 
 





1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Some puzzling features about currency crises are the inconsinstent and volatile reactions
of markets to changes in economic fundamentals, and the alternation between times when
currency pegs appear vulnerable to attacks and times when they don’t. These features
have frequently been taken as signs of multiple equilibria,1 and some theoretical models
in the literature show that this may indeed be so. Those models propose an alternation
between periods with a unique equilibrium (when the peg is “safe”) and periods with
multiple equilibria (when the peg is “vulnerable”) as an explanation for the puzzle.2
∗This paper is partly based on Chapter 2 of my PhD dissertation at Yale University. I am very grateful to Stephen
Morris, my advisor, for his guidance. I also thank Fernando Broner, Francesco Caselli, Jaume Ventura and several seminar
participants for their comments, BM&F for the data and Nathan Foley-Fisher for superb research assistance ﬁnanced by
STICERD.
†London School of Economics, Department of Economics. Email: b.guimaraes@lse.ac.uk
1In the words of Angeletos and Werning (2006), “crises can be described as times of high non-fundamental volatility:
they involve large and abrupt changes in outcomes, but often lack obvious comparable changes in fundamentals. Many
attribute an important role to more or less arbitrary shifts in ‘market sentiments’ or ‘animal spirits’, and models with
multiple equilibria formalize these ideas”.
2See Obstfeld (1986, 1996), Jeanne (1997), Chamley (2003), Chari and Kehoe (2003) and Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan
(2007).
1Moreover, regressions of the estimates of expectations about currency crises on macro-
economic fundamentals typically fail to ﬁnd a clear link between those macroeconomic
variables and crises.3 Such failure is often taken as empirical support for multiple-
equilibrium models.4 However, this empirical support is subject to a critique: there may
be a fundamental latent variable that determines the outcomes and is missing from the
study.5 The problem is especially complicated by the poor explanatory power of macro-
economic variables for the exchange rate: the weak connection between macroeconomic
fundamentals and crises may only be reﬂecting the exchange rate disconnect puzzle.6
In this paper, I examine data on expectations about the Brazilian peg in the period
leading up to the currency devaluation of January 1999. Large swings in the probability
of a devaluation are present, and periods of higher risk coincide with crises in Asia and
Russia. As in the previous studies discussed above, a regression of the risk of a devaluation
on Brazilian macro variables would yield nothing whatsoever (Campa et al, 2002) and
might be taken as support for multiple equilibria.7
But I oﬀer an alternative explanation, a simple model with a unique equilibrium in
which the peg is abandoned when the currency overvaluation crosses a threshold. Two
latent variables are essential to the model: currency overvaluation and the threshold that
leads the government to abandon the peg. By making reasonable and parsimonious as-
sumptions on how the market learns about the threshold, I obtain implications about the
probability and expected magnitude of a currency devaluation – which can be empiri-
cally tested and are not obtained in multiple-equilibrium models. The implications are
consistent with empirical estimates prior to the 1999 Brazilian currency crisis.
I begin with the empirical assessment of expectations. I identify the probability and
expected magnitude of a devaluation of the Brazilian Real from January 1997 to January
3Rose and Svensson (1994) state that “it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd economically meaningful relationships between realignment
expectations and macroeconomic variables”. Campa and Chang (1998) and Campa, Chang and Refalo (2002) report that
“macroeconomic variables are largely unable to explain intertemporal movements in realignment risk”.
4For example, the herding model of Chari and Kehoe (2003) aims to explain the “random component of international
capital ﬂows”, stating that “even after the data on historical crises are conditioned on an extensive list of macroeconomic
fundamentals, a sizable nonfundamental, or random, component to the crises remains”.
5See discussion in Jeanne (1999).
6Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000) deﬁne the exchange rate disconnect puzzle as “the exceedingly weak relationship (except
perhaps in the long run) between the exchange rate and virtually any macroeconomic aggregates”. From there, it is fair
to conjecture that macroeconomic variables are also loosely connected to the exchange rate which would prevail if the
government were to abandon the exchange rate peg at a given moment. But that is the key latent variable in currency
crises, because it is (i) the main determinant of the proﬁt s / l o s s e sa g e n t sw i l lm a k ei ft h e yd e c i d et oa t t a c kt h ec u r r e n c ya n d
(ii) a key determinant of the cost to the government of maintaining the peg.
7Paul Krugman summarised this view: “I cannot see any way to make sense of the contagion of 1997-8 without supposing
the existence of multiple equilibria, with countries vulnerable to self-validating collapses in conﬁdence, collapses that could
be set oﬀ by events in faraway economies that somehow served as a trigger for self-fulﬁlling pessimism.” Krugman (1999),
page 35. See also the critique in Garber (1999).
21999, when the peg was abandoned, using data on exchange rate options to estimate an
asset pricing model. Among emerging economies that suﬀered currency crises, Brazil has
especially good data on options.8
Options provide information about the probability density of the exchange rate at
diﬀerent points, so it is possible to disentangle the “thickness of the tail of the distribution”
(probability of a devaluation) from the “distance from the tail to the centre” (the expected
magnitude of a devaluation). The following example illustrates the identiﬁcation: suppose
the price of an asset tomorrow will be 1 with probability 1 − p and 3 with probability
p. In a risk-neutral world, a call option with strike price 1 costs 2p, a call option with
strike price 2 costs p. If the probability of a devaluation (p) increases, both options get
more expensive but the ratio of their prices remains equal to 2. If the magnitude of the
devaluation increases from 3 to 4, the option with strike price 1 will cost 3p, the option
with strike price 2 will cost 2p – the ratio changes.
Completely diﬀerent behaviour for the probability and expected magnitude of a de-
valuation emerge from the empirical work. The probability of a devaluation was volatile
and mostly driven by contagion from external crises, as the Asian and Russian crises
triggered by far the greatest increases in the probability of a devaluation. The expected
magnitude of a devaluation (conditional on its occurrence) was very stable and entirely
unaﬀected by the Russian episode. Interestingly, the moments in which the probability of
a crisis increased sharply coincide with sizable depreciations of ﬂexible exchange rates of
countries in similar situations (like Mexico), suggesting a link between the probability of
a crisis in Brazil and the Brazilian exchange rate that would prevail in a ﬂoating regime.
Following the empirical results, I present the model. The peg is abandoned when the
currency overvaluation hits a certain threshold, unknown to private agents. I assume that
agents learn about the threshold only when it is “tested”. The expected magnitude of a
devaluation is the expected value of that threshold. The probability of a devaluation is
the likelihood that threshold will be reached.
While the currency overvaluation is low, in a “safe zone”, shocks to it bring no infor-
mation about the threshold. Therefore, shocks to the currency overvaluation normally
aﬀect only the probability of a devaluation. The expected magnitude of a devaluation
m a yo n l yb ea ﬀected when the probability is very high – consistently with the data.
That is because when a shock to the currency overvaluation puts it at a point where the
peg might be abandoned (leading to a very high probability of devaluation) but the peg is
8European exchange rate options between the Brazilian Real and the US Dollar were regularly traded at São Paulo
Futures Exchange (BM&F).
3maintained, agents learn that the threshold for abandoning the peg is higher than the level
just reached. That increases the expected magnitude of a devaluation. Then any decrease
in the currency overvaluation leads to a relatively lower probability of devaluation.
The perceived risk of a devaluation depends not on the currency overvaluation but
on the distance from the expected threshold. So, for the same currency overvaluation,
t h ep e gm a yl o o ks a f ea tt i m e sa n dv u l n e r a b l ea to t h e rt i m e s ,n o tb e c a u s eo fm u l t i p l e
equilibria but because learning about the threshold can dramatically change the market
assessment of risk. Naturally, the eﬀect of the currency overvaluation on the probability
of a devaluation is highly non-linear, so shocks to the currency overvaluation generate
large probability swings in some times, and small changes in others.
The environment of the model is suﬃciently simple that an option can be priced and
used to estimate the path of the currency overvaluation. The increases in the Brazilian
currency overvaluation, following the crises in Asia and Russia, needed to quantitatively
replicate the large swings in the probability of a devaluation present in the data are of
a magnitude similar to those experienced by the ﬂoating Mexican exchange rate at the
same time.
One key distinction between models in this literature is the role of expectations in
producing the set of equilibria. In the ﬁrst generation models (Krugman, 1979, Flood
and Garber, 1984), a currency attack is due to bad fundamentals. In contrast, the second
generation models (Obstfeld, 1986, 1996) showed how sudden changes in expectations
could move an economy to a crisis equilibrium. In the more recent global game models,
pioneered by Morris and Shin (1998), expectations are important to agents’ decisions, and
subtleties in the information structure (whether it is public or private) are important in
determining the number and characteristics of equilibria. Therefore, identifying patterns
in the behaviour of expectations and connecting them to models is important as a selection
criterion, yet relatively little has been done.9
Further comments on related empirical and theoretical literature are deferred to the
relevant Sections. Section 2 contains the empirical identiﬁcation of the probability and
expected magnitude of a devaluation. The theoretical model is presented in Section 3
and used to obtain the path of Brazilian currency overvaluation in Section 4. Section 5
concludes.
9A few contributions to the study of currency crises have attempted to connect theoretical models and empirical data
on expectations. Blanco and Garber (1986) generate predictions on expectations about the recurrent devaluation of the
Mexican Peso using a variation on the monetary model of Flood and Garber (1984). In one of the few explicit tests for
sunspots, Jeanne (1997) performs a likelihood ratio test for the existence of multiple equilibria in the French Franc crisis.
He ﬁnds some inexplicable shifts between diﬀerent equilibria.
42 The probability and magnitude of a devaluation
The Brazilian crawling peg was instituted in March 1995 as part of a plan intended to
counter the persistent inﬂation experienced by the economy. Under the peg, the exchange
rate could ﬂoat inside a mini-band that was less than 1% wide. The mini-band was read-
justed by about 0.6% each month, distributed over 5 to 7 smaller changes. The objective
was to stabilise sustainably the exchange rate, but the sustainability was questionable
given the large current account deﬁcits that suggested the Brazilian Real was overvalued.
Figure 1: Interest Rates
As Figure 1 shows, interest rates increased by 20 and 15 percentage points due to
the Asian (end of 1997) and Russian crises (from August 1998) respectively. This is a
testament to the impact these events had on the credibility of the peg – which was ﬁnally
abandoned in January 1999. The remainder of this Section identiﬁes the probability and
expected magnitude of a devaluation of the Real from January 1997 to January 1999.
2.1 Empirical identiﬁcation
The exchange rate risk in a pegged regime depends on the probability that the peg will be
abandoned and on the expected size of a consequent currency devaluation. The forward
premium is roughly the product of these two variables and may be estimated through
5some relatively simple calculations. However, observing the forward premium alone does
not permit individual identiﬁcation of the probability of a devaluation and its expected
magnitude: a forward premium of 3% a year may refer to an expected devaluation of 30%
with probability 10% a year, or an expected devaluation of 5% with probability 60% a
year, and so on.
Options are a richer source of data because they provide information about the prob-
ability density of the exchange rate at diﬀerent points, which allows identiﬁcation of the
probability and expected magnitude of a devaluation. Extracting information on the risks
of discrete price jumps from data on options is not a novelty. It was the approach taken by
Bates (1991) to estimate Merton’s (1976) model when testing whether the stock market
crash of 1987 had been expected.10
However, it is unusual for the empirical literature to identify accurately the probabilities
and expected magnitudes of jumps. That is because, in general, the risk of discrete jumps
co-exist with the regular disturbances. Subtle changes in options prices correspond to
signiﬁcant changes in the probability distribution of the future value of the asset, so it is
diﬃcult to obtain accurate estimates for both the probability and magnitude of a jump.11
Identiﬁcation in the case of the Brazilian pegged regime is relatively easier because the
volatility of the exchange rate before the crisis was very small, so most of the information
contained in option prices relates to the risk of a change in regime. Indeed, the vast
majority of options in the sample was worth zero at maturity, which means those options
were concerned only with the risk of a large devaluation.
Campa et al (2002) estimated the credibility of the Brazilian exchange regime using
a non-parametric method. Provided the data were very accurate, their method would
obtain the risk neutral densities without any further assumptions. However, in Brazil
the lack of liquidity in the market for options leads to substantial noise in the option
prices and a purely non-parametric approach cannot be applied. If their methodology
were used to construct daily risk-neutral densities, 58% of the days in the sample of this
paper would generate probability density functions with some negative values. A better
alternative when faced with such noisy data is to use an adequate model to help identify
the probability and expected magnitude of a devaluation.
10See also Campa and Chang (1996) and Malz (1996) for studies of the credibility of the ERM using data on options.
11For example, Bates (1991) estimates the probability and expected size of a jump in the US stock market before the
crash of 1987 and ﬁnds signiﬁcant risk of a negative adjustment in parts of his sample. The estimators of the probability
and expected magnitude of the jump are very inaccurate but negatively correlated, so estimators of the product of them
(roughly the price of the risk of a jump) are more precise.
62.2 The asset pricing model
In this paper, a simple asset pricing model is used to estimate the probability and expected
magnitude of a devaluation. The model replicates the main features of the Brazilian
crawling peg in a simple way.
Denote by S t h ee x c h a n g er a t ea n ds its logarithm. Initially, the exchange rate follows
a standard Brownian motion with low volatility:12
ds = µ1dt + σ1dX
In January 1999, the Brazilian exchange rate was allowed to ﬂoat, and a discrete
devaluation took place. Accordingly, in this simple model, the pegged regime may be
abandoned at any time. It is convenient to translate the probability of a regime switch
into a hazard rate, and the simplest way to do it is to assume that the above process can
be interrupted by a Poisson event with hazard rate λ that leads to a discrete jump in the
exchange rate and to a new diﬀusion process that is assumed to last forever.




The ﬂoating regime is described by a Brownian motion with drift and much higher
volatility:
ds = µ2dt + σ2dX
It is easy to extend the model to incorporate a log-normal jump, and the formula for
the price of an option is similar. However, as the standard deviation of the jump plays a
role similar to σ2, it is not possible to get signiﬁcant estimates for both with the available
data for options on Brazilian Real.
The formulae and estimations in this paper consider risk-neutral agents.13 Ac a l lo p t i o n
gives its owner the right to purchase one unit of foreign currency at strike price X.A s
explained in Appendix A.1, the price of a European call with maturity at time T is:
12Such a formulation does not correspond to a mini-band regime, but it serves as a good approximation for the short run
path of the Brazilian exchange rate under a maintained peg.
13The formula would also be valid for risk averse agents if the risk of a jump were diversiﬁable and uncorrelated with the
market as in Merton (1976). In this case, it would be possible to get an instantaneous zero-beta portfolio and the price
of an option would not depend on any individual preferences. In particular, options would have the same value as in a
risk-neutral world.
I ft h er i s ko fac h a n g ei nt h ee x c h a n g er e g i m ei ss y s t e m a t i ca n dc a n n o tb ed i v e r s i ﬁed, there is no way to get a riskless portfolio
and a price independent of agents’ risk aversion. Then, using additional assumptions about individuals’ preferences and the
correlation between their wealth and the underlying assets, it is possible to get richer theoretical models as in Bates (1991,
1996). However, the empirical results would depend on those assumptions. If agents are risk-neutral, observable ﬁnancial
























where r i st h ed o m e s t i ci n t e r e s tr a t e ,q is the interest rate denominated in foreign
currency, X i st h es t r i k ep r i c e ,S i st h es p o te x c h a n g er a t ea n dBS(S,T;X,r,σ2) denotes
the Black and Scholes price of a call option. The ﬁrst term of Equation 1 represents the
value of the option if the peg is not abandoned at time T. The integrand of the second
term is the option price given a devaluation at time t multiplied by its probability density
function.
The parameter λ reﬂects the “thickness of the tail of the distribution” and k corre-
sponds to the “distance between the tail and the centre of the distribution”. Intuitively,
the estimated changes in the expected magnitude of a devaluation are due to changes in
the ratio between the jump component of the prices of options with diﬀerent strike prices.
The estimated changes in probability reﬂect changes in the jump component of the prices
of options without changes in their ratios.
To help illustrate identiﬁcation, consider the following example. For some standard
parameter values,14 options with diﬀerent λ’s and k’s, and strike prices equal to 1020 and
1100 are priced as shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Example for identiﬁcation
λk C(X=1020) C(X=1100) ratio
0.10 0.10 0.90 0.28 3.2
0.20 0.10 1.79 0.56 3.2
0.10 0.20 1.86 1.10 1.7
If λ =0 .1 and k =0 .1, an option with strike 1020 is worth 3.2 options with strike 1100.
If k =0 .1 and λ =0 .2, both options get roughly twice as expensive because the probability
of the option having a positive value at maturity doubles while the probability density of
the asset conditional on the occurrence of a jump has not changed. Therefore, the ratio
between the option prices remains almost unchanged. On the other hand, if λ =0 .1 and
k =0 .2, the higher magnitude of a devaluation translates into a higher expected value of
S − X conditional on S>X .C r u c i a l l y ,t h i si n c r e a s ei sm o r ep r o n o u n c e di nt h ec a s eo f
14S = 1000, T =0 .1 year, r =0 .2/year, q =0 .1/year, σ1 =0 .01/year and σ2 =0 .25/year.
8the option with higher strike price and the option-price ratio falls to 1.7. That is the key
to identify the probability and expected size of a currency devaluation.
2.3 Data and estimation
The observed price of a call option (Cobs) is assumed to be equal to the model price (Cmod)




where   is a mean-zero error term, independent of the observable variables. The para-
meters of Equation 2 were estimated by non-linear least squares.
To estimate the parameters of Equation 2, the following data are required: domestic
interest rates denominated in domestic and foreign currency; spot exchange rate; and op-
tion prices. Interest rate and exchange rate data are available from very liquid markets.15
Unfortunately, the option market is much less liquid and, since there is no reliable record
of the time each option was traded, the price of the last trade for every option must be
used.16 The available data refer to trades realised at potentially diﬀerent times. Espe-
cially in periods when the markets were nervous, this may introduce large measurement
error in the dependent variable, as discussed in Appendix B.17
The options are European calls, the underlying asset is the US Dollar and the contracts
a r et ob ep a i di nB r a z i l i a nReal. 75% of the options in the sample were traded less than
45 days before maturity, so the obtained estimates are measures of expectations about
t h ep e gi nt h es h o r tr u n . O p t i o n st r a d e dt o oc l o s et om a t u r i t y( l e s st h a n1 0d a y s )
were discarded, as they contain little information about implicit distributions and their
prices are not much greater than the bid-ask spread. In addition, transactions in at least
four strike classes with the same maturity were required for each day. Finally, some
questionable observations of a few far out-of-the-money option classes were excluded. In
the end, there were 3,587 observations in the sample corresponding to 474 days and 25
months. Appendix B provides more details on the data.
λ and k are constants in the model but in the estimations they are allowed to vary over
time. This is a potential source of inconsistency, however some Monte Carlo experiments
presented in Appendix A.2 show that, for at least some diﬀusion processes of λ,s u c ha
procedure yields reasonable estimates. This is hardly surprising, as prices of European
15All data are from contracts traded at São Paulo Futures Exchange (BM&F).
16In theory, options were traded at the exchange. In practice, options were traded over the counter and then registered
at BM&F.
17It is possible to interpret the error term in Equation 2 as measurement error in the dependent variable.
9calls do not depend on the particular paths of the hazard rate and magnitude of jump
but on the probability distribution of the exchange rate at the maturity date. Indeed,
the estimation of diﬀerent λ’s and k’s is the standard procedure in the literature (see, for
example, Bates (1991, 1996) and Jondeau and Rockinger (2000)). In the empirical work,
λ and k are either estimated for each of the 695 sets of options of a certain maturity
traded in a given day or constrained to be constant during each of the 25 months.
2.4 Results
Figure 2: Daily Estimates
Figure 2 shows the results when λ and k are allowed to vary across dates and maturity
dates, assuming σ1 =0 .75% per year and σ2 =2 5 .5% per year.18 Among the 695 {λ,k}
estimated, 442 pairs have a t-statistic higher than 2 for both estimates. Figure 2 shows
just the results for those 442 ‘signiﬁcant’ days. The estimates of λ higher than 0.17 are
plotted as if they were equal to 0.17 (ﬁve cases yield signiﬁcant estimates of λ between
0.25 and 0.40).19 The vertical lines mark the periods in which the ‘devaluation premium’
is high.
1825.5% is the standard deviation of the observed daily changes in the exchange rate from 1/19/99 to 12/31/99
19Nothing substantial changes in the Figures if the lower bound for t-statistics and the censorship limit is altered.
10The top left graph shows the devaluation premium, λk. Unsurprisingly, it resembles
Figure 1: the two major shocks in the series follow the Asian and the Russian crises.20
The options allow us to disentangle and determine the relative importance of the two
key components of the forward premium. A dramatic increase in the probability of a
devaluation follows both crises, and is the predominant cause of the rise in the devaluation
premium. The expected magnitude appears lower in 1997 than in 1998, but shows no sign
of being aﬀected by the foreign crises.
Figure 3 presents the estimates when λ and k are constrained to be constant within
each month, whilst maintaining the assumption that σ1 =0 .75% p e ry e a ra n dσ2 =2 5 .5%
per year. If there are substantial variations in the probability and expected magnitude
during a month, it is not clear how mixing diﬀerent option dates will impact the estimates.
Nonetheless, it is a useful exercise to help understand the daily estimates.
Figure 3: Monthly estimates
Figures 2 and 3 show expectations about the Brazilian pegged regime from January
1997 to January 1999. At the end of October 1997, the Asian crisis strongly aﬀected the
credibility of the Real. The probability of a devaluation reached its peak in November
1997 but had returned to previous levels by February 1998. It remained low until August,
20Actually, the interest rate rise is greater than the increase in the devaluation premium due to the additional increase
in the risk of default.
11when Russia defaulted on its debt, upon which it sharply rose and remained around 5%
per month until January 1999, when the peg was removed. The parameter k increased at
some point in 1997 and remained roughly stable around 15% after the Asian crisis until
the end of the pegged regime. In 1998, virtually all changes in the devaluation premium
were due to movements in the probability of a devaluation; the Russian crisis appears to
have had no eﬀect on the expected magnitude.
Both the Asian and Russian crises strongly aﬀected the probability of a devaluation
but had little or no eﬀect on its expected magnitude. More generally, ﬂuctuations in the
devaluation premium are largely explained by movements in λ alone. The correlation
between λ and λk is 92%, while the correlation between k and λk is only 37%.
Table 2 shows the value of estimates and standard errors in the monthly exercise. The
lowest pseudo-t-statistic is 2.96 and the average pseudo-t-statistic is 7.6.
Interestingly, as shown in Figure 2, the greatest jumps in the Mexican exchange rate
coincided with the largest movements in the probability of a devaluation in Brazil. Like
Brazil, Mexico had large current account deﬁcits by that time and few direct links with
Russia, Korea or Hong Kong, but its currency was ﬂoating. It is reasonable to expect
that the Brazilian “shadow exchange rate” and the Mexican ﬂoating rate would respond
to the Asian and Russian crises in similar ways: had the Brazilian currency been ﬂoating,
it would have depreciated.21
The monthly probability of a devaluation was almost always below 10% and remained
around 5% from September 1998 until January 1999. Even as the regime break ap-
proached, the estimates of λ did not increase sharply.22 Indeed, Brazilian interest rates
were decreasing (from 2.93% per month in October 1998 to 2.38% per month in Decem-
b e r1 9 9 8 ) ,t h eg o v e r n m e n te n t e r e di n t oa na r r a n g e m e n tw i t ht h eI M Ft o w a r d st h ee n do f
1998, and some macroeconomic reports were pointing to an increase in the credibility of
the currency by December 1998.23
The results also show that agents underestimated the size of the jump: while the
expected depreciation is never greater than 20%, the observed devaluation was as high
as 60%. Some comments on the discrepancy between the expected and the observed
devaluation are in Appendix C.
21Actually, the crises of 1997-8 negatively aﬀected all the main Latin American synchronically ﬂoating currencies. The
Chilean Peso, despite the good economic performance of Chile, was adversely hit by the Asian crisis. The Colombian Peso
lost 10% of its value in the month following the Russian default (its average monthly devaluation over the period was 2%).
22There are estimates for λ until 01/08/99, 3 business days before the jump. Options get slightly more expensive 1 or 2
days before the devaluation.
23For example, the December 1998 economic analysis bulletin of IPEA (the Brazilian institute for research in applied
economics) states that ‘(...) the pressure on the exchange rate got milder, and now a speculative attack is less likely to
occur’, IPEA (1998, in Portuguese), page 6.
12Table 2: Monthly estimates of k and λ
k λ (year−1)
Jan-1997 0.0491 (0.0042) 0.2929 (0.0166)
Feb-1997 0.0646 (0.0136) 0.1307 (0.0196)
Mar-1997 0.0442 (0.0060) 0.1378 (0.0099)
Apr-1997 0.0471 (0.0092) 0.2060 (0.0245)
May-1997 0.0389 (0.0055) 0.2702 (0.0229)
Jun-1997 0.0715 (0.0112) 0.0914 (0.0119)
Jul-1997 0.0735 (0.0132) 0.0876 (0.0135)
Ago-1997 0.0904 (0.0239) 0.1212 (0.0324)
Sep-1997 0.1135 (0.0122) 0.1812 (0.0233)
Oct-1997 0.1350 (0.0401) 0.0987 (0.0334)
Nov-1997 0.1076 (0.0131) 0.8690 (0.1252)
Dec-1997 0.1299 (0.0154) 0.4054 (0.0586)
Jan-1998 0.1216 (0.0121) 0.5472 (0.0667)
Feb-1998 0.1606 (0.0205) 0.1247 (0.0193)
Mar-1998 0.1154 (0.0112) 0.1411 (0.0148)
Apr-1998 0.1707 (0.0138) 0.0961 (0.0090)
May-1998 0.1464 (0.0254) 0.1589 (0.0316)
Jun-1998 0.1723 (0.0164) 0.1436 (0.0153)
Jul-1998 0.1913 (0.0280) 0.0612 (0.0097)
Ago-1998 0.1481 (0.0330) 0.1252 (0.0303)
Sep-1998 0.1411 (0.0217) 0.5461 (0.0935)
Oct-1998 0.1877 (0.0216) 0.4509 (0.0600)
Nov-1998 0.1845 (0.0274) 0.3251 (0.0554)
Dec-1998 0.1051 (0.0157) 0.7966 (0.1362)
Jan-1999 0.1319 (0.0149) 0.5431 (0.0733)
Standard deviations in parentheses.
133A s i m p l e m o d e l
This section presents a stylised model of currency crises that is consistent with the evi-
dence above. The key ingredients are: (i) the devaluation is triggered when the currency
overvaluation crosses a threshold; and (ii) the threshold is unknown, agents are learning
about it, and they have the opportunity to learn when the currency overvaluation goes
above its previous maximum, as it indicates to the agents that the threshold is higher
than they previously thought.
Many models imply that a peg is abandoned when a threshold is crossed. The ﬁrst gen-
eration models of currency crises (Krugman, (1979), Flood and Garber (1984)) predicted
that a currency attack would occur when fundamentals crossed a fundamental thresh-
old. Some recent dynamic models of currency crises based on that framework also yield
fundamental thresholds for a currency devaluation (Guimaraes (2006), Broner (2007)),
although others lead to diﬀerent implications (e.g., Pastine (2002)).
Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995) defend the idea that the costs and beneﬁts for the govern-
ment to keep the peg are the key determinants for the fate of the exchange rate regime, as
countries usually have enough reserves to sustain a currency peg. If those costs and bene-
ﬁts are not aﬀected by agents’ expectations, then the logic of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995)
implies that a peg is abandoned when some economic fundamentals are “bad enough” –
e.g., when the currency overvaluation crosses a threshold.
Assuming that the costs and beneﬁts for the government to maintain the peg depend
on what agents do, Obstfeld (1986, 1996), among others, developed a multiple-equilibria
explanation for the puzzling behaviour of markets with respect to currency crises. Obstfeld
(1986, 1996) get a coordination game between the agents and, with complete information,
multiple equilibria. But Morris and Shin (1998, 1999) added incomplete information
to the coordination game and obtained a unique equilibrium in which a currency crisis
occurs if economic fundamentals go beyond a threshold. Adding uncertainty about the
government costs and beneﬁts to Morris and Shin (1999) would lead to a model with an
uncertain threshold, with implications similar to the model in this paper.
3.1 The model
In Section 2, the probability and expected magnitude of a devaluation are exogenous
variables to be estimated. Here, they will be obtained endogenously. The primitives
of the model are the paths of the exchange rate and the currency overvaluation, and
the distribution of the threshold that triggers a currency devaluation. All of these are
14observed by the agents. The model impose restrictions on the behaviour of the probability
and expected magnitude of a devaluation that may be inconsistent with the analysis
presented in Section 2.
The exchange rate process before the peg is abandoned is identical to that of the
previous section:
ds = µ1dt + σ1dX1
Currency overvaluation in logs is denoted by θ and follows a similar stochastic process:24
dθ = µθdt + σθdXθ (3)
Denoting by φ the shadow exchange rate, i.e. the exchange rate if the government
decided to abandon the peg:
φ = s + θ
Thus, when the pegged regime is abandoned, t h ed ef a c t om a g n i t u d eo ft h ed e v a l u a t i o n
will equal to θ – the exchange rate jump from s to φ.
The peg will be abandoned whenever the currency overvaluation hits a threshold, θ
∗,
unknown to the agents. An important implication of this assumption is that the expected
magnitude of a devaluation conditional on its occurrence is substantially diﬀerent from the
unconditional expectation of θ. The devaluation occurs when θ crosses θ
∗ and conditioning
t h ee x p e c t e dv a l u eo fθ on that information makes a big diﬀerence.
Denote the maximum value that θ h a sa c h i e v e du pt ot i m et by θ
min. We know that
θ
∗ >θ















∗) is the probability that θ
∗ will be reached before time τ.A sl o n ga s
θ<θ






















min) is the probability that θ
min will be reached before time τ and
preach(θ
∗|θ
min) is the probability that θ
∗ will be reached before τ conditional on θ
min
24Assuming some slow mean reversion would not qualitatively change the results.






















As long as θ<θ
min,i n c r e a s e si nθ drive the economy closer to the region where the
devaluation is possible, increasing the probability of a devaluation.


















































which is independent of θ.
Provided θ remains below θ








min,i n c r e a s e si nθ provide no extra information about θ
∗, causing therefore
no impact on the expected magnitude of a devaluation. The unconditional expected cur-
rency overvaluation is diﬀerent from the expected magnitude of a devaluation conditional
on its occurrence.
On the other hand, when θ is at θ
min, upward movements in θ increase θ
min and the
expected magnitude of a devaluation conditional on its occurrence is thus aﬀected. It can
be shown, and is intuitive, that the expected magnitude of a devaluation is increasing in
θ
min.W h e nθ = θ
min, the probability of a devaluation is at its highest since the last time
θ reached θ
min and the expected magnitude increases with any shock to θ.25
Thus the model predicts that the increases in Brazilian currency overvaluation should
normally aﬀect only the probability of a devaluation, but will aﬀect its expected magnitude
when the probability of a devaluation reaches new heights. These predictions are borne
25The possibility of discrete jumps in the currency overvaluation would weaken this result: the expected magnitude of
a devaluation would then be somewhat aﬀected by movements in θ. But if the frequency of the jumps were small, the
eﬀect would not be large. The empirical results suggest that the possibility of jumps in the currency overvaluation might
be important, but for simplicity I abstract from them in the analysis.
16out by the movements of the probability and expected magnitude in 1998 and are close
to the pattern observed in 1997: virtually all movement occurs in the probability, except
for the increase in the magnitude of a devaluation when the Asian crisis erupted.
Both the empirical results and the model predictions contrast with the predictions of
an extreme sunspot model, where maintaining the peg is entirely independent of currency
overvaluation. In Appendix D I show, in that case, there is a disconnection between θ and
the probability of a devaluation that implies a connection between θ and the expected
magnitude of a devaluation. Those predictions are at odds with the empirical results.
In the model, agents do not have any information about θ
∗ besides θ
min and its distri-
bution, so they just update their beliefs about θ
∗ when θ reaches θ
min. One could think
that, in reality, agents could access other sources of information about θ
∗.H o w e v e r ,i ti s
actually diﬃcult for the government to communicate its commitment to the peg because
the incentive to assert the peg will only be abandoned in dramatic circunstances (abnor-
mally high values of θ) is always present. That is because the devaluation premium (the
product of probability and expected magnitude) depends negatively on the expected value
of θ
∗, which can be interpreted as a higher perceived commitment to the peg. A higher
θ
min (or a higher expected θ
∗) leads to a lower devaluation premium because it lowers the
probability of a devaluation and increases its expected magnitude, but the eﬀect on the
probability dominates, due to the strong non-linear dependance of the probability of a
devaluation on the distance between θt and θ
min.26
4 Empirical estimation of the model
The environment of the model is simple enough to price an option. Using the data on
option prices, we can infer the path of θ. This exercise serves two purposes: (i) to check
whether the simple model can generate values for the probability and expected magnitude
of the devaluation consistent with the data, under reasonable assumptions on parameters;
and (ii) to examine the path of the shadow exchange rate implied by the model and the
option data.
Some simplifying assumptions are necessary to facilitate the estimation process. I
26Going a bit outside the model, the negative impact of θmin on the devaluation premium explains why governments are
keen to declare they will never leave the peg unless the world ends — in other words, θ∗ is close to inﬁnity.
17assume that dX1 and dXθ are independent, so:27





and the distribution of θ
∗, g(θ
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Given the exponential distribution, the probability of a devaluation depends only on
θ − θ
min.W h e nθ = θ
min, the probability is at its maximum, independent of θ
min.
Denote by θt and θ
min
t t h ev a l u e so fθ and θ
min at date t.
In a risk-neutral world, the price of the option with strike price X and maturity at









∗) is the price of a call option conditional on a given value of θ
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∗,T) is the price of a call option conditional on θ
∗ being reached at time T,
h(θ
∗,T) is the probability density that θ
∗ will be reached at time T, BS is the Black-
Scholes price of an option, prob and E(magn) are the probability and expected magnitude














where f(θτ|θT = θ
∗) is the probability density of θτ conditional on θT = θ
∗.
The densities f and h depend on the diﬀusion process of θ.T h u s , t h e o p t i o n p r i c e
can be calculated as a function of θt, θ
min






θ,δ) are calibrated. The values of µ1 and σ1 are taken
from the crawling mini-band regime, in the period of January-1997 to January-1999. I
set µθ =0for simplicity. I choose σθ and δ so that the currency overvaluation in the
ﬁrst half of 1997 is small but usually positive. As long as that restriction is respected,
diﬀerent choices of parameters yield very similar results. I present results using σθ =
27This assumption is made for simplicity, the process of s is only important to price some few options with lower strike
price, so that should not make a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the estimation of θ. But it is worth mentioning that in the end of
1997, while the risk of a devaluation was sky rocketing, s stayed at the bottom of the “mini-band” (perhaps surprisingly).
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Ie s t i m a t eav a l u eo fθt for every day and θ
min
0 . Then, θ
min







values of θt are estimated sequentially, for the sake of simplicity. The results are shown
in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Path of θ, probability and expected magnitude
The top graph shows θt and the expected magnitude of a devaluation conditional on
its occurrence in a month. The latter is equal to θ
min plus a constant that depends on
δ, the parameters of the stochastic processes, and the time span. The value of θt at
the end of 1998 is close to the peak reached at the end of 1997. Consistent with the
results obtained in Section 2, the expected magnitude of a devaluation conditional on
its occurrence increases following the Asian crises and stays constant from then on. The
bottom graph shows that the path of the probability of a devaluation is very similar to
that obtained in Section 2. The model thus generates sensible values for the probability
and expected magnitude of a devaluation.
These results suggest the following story: in 1997, ﬂuctuations in θ had small or mod-
erate impacts on the probability of a devaluation until the end of October 1997, when
a large shock to the currency overvaluation occurred: θ increased by around 10% – a
19similar devaluation was experienced by the Mexican Peso. Then, the current value of θt
had surpassed θ
min
t−1 and reached the region where an immediate devaluation was possible.
The probability of a change in regime was very high, agents were uncertain whether the
government would let the currency ﬂoat or not. The government did not, despite the
very high interest rates resulting from the high risk of a devaluation. Agents learnt, θ
min
increased, so the expected θ
∗ and hence the expected magnitude of a devaluation became
higher than before the crisis.28
By the end of February 1998, the probability of a devaluation was back to low levels
and fell even further during the year – to a trough where it was close to the lowest levels
observed in 1997. Currency overvaluation, θ, never receded as much, though it decreased
somewhat and, although much higher than before the crisis, was far enough from θ
min to
generate a low probability of devaluation since agents knew that it would take a relatively
higher θ to make the government abandon the peg. A similar currency overvaluation in
1997 would have corresponded not only to a higher probability of devaluation but also





on the probability of a devaluation, as explained above.
The arrival of the ﬁrst signs of trouble from Russia led to a 5% increase in the cur-
rency overvaluation, driving θ very close to θ
min and triggering a massive increase in the
probability of a devaluation. The expected magnitude of a devaluation did not change
– because θ did not go beyond θ
min – but any sharp movement in θ m i g h th a v ep u ti t
beyond θ
min and, perhaps, triggered a devaluation.
I nA n g e l e t o se ta l( 2 0 0 7 ) ,t h ec h a n g ei nt h em o o do ft h em a r k e ti sd u et oc h a n g e sf r o m
a unique equilibrium to multiple equilibria. Here, instead, the market learns that the
government is willing to sustain the peg at a certain level, which decreases the likelihood
of a devaluation. It is a model with a unique prediction so changes in expectations
require changes in the currency overvaluation, but those can be small (a fall of 3-4% in
the currency overvaluation takes the probability from the highest level to a very low level).
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
The Asian crisis in 1997 and the Russian crisis in 1998 have shaken ﬁnancial markets
a r o u n dt h ew o r l d .T h i sp a p e rs h o w st h a tt h e ya ﬀected the risk of a devaluation in Brazil
mostly through the probability of a devaluation, rather than the expected magnitude.
It oﬀers the following explanation: by driving the currency overvaluation to a region
28Similar learning eﬀects after a “ﬁre test” are present in other papers (e.g., Chari and Kehoe, 2003).
20where agents were unsure about whether the peg would be kept, those shocks increased
the probability of a devaluation. The defence of the Real by the Brazilian government
following the Asian crisis convinced the agents that the threshold for abandoning the
peg was higher, which increased the expected magnitude of a devaluation, conditional on
its occurrence, but allowed for a decrease in the probability when the economic climate
got slightly better. The subsequent negative shock in the second half of 1998 drove the
exchange rate close to the threshold again, and once more the probability of a devaluation
soared. Moderate shifts of Brazilian currency overvaluation due to the Asian and Russian
crises can account for these massive increases in the probability of a devaluation.
Some theoretical mechanisms that can lead to currency crises are now well under-
stood, but the empirical literature hasn’t caught the pace of sophistication of the recent
theoretical literature. Progress in distinguishing between models with multiple equilibria
and models driven by latent variables is crucial for our understanding of crises. That re-
quires models, however simple, that can be directly connected to data and yield testable
predictions.
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23A The asset pricing model
A.1 Formula for the price of a call
























where BS(S,T;X,r,σ2) denotes the Black-Scholes price of a European call option if
the underlying asset follows a Brownian motion with drift
¡
dS
S = µ.dt + σ.dX
¢
, r is the
interest rate, X is the strike price, S i st h es p o te x c h a n g er a t ea n dT i st h et i m et o
maturity.







where q is the interest rate denominated in foreign currency.
The ﬁrst term of Equation 1 is the value of the option if there is no devaluation until
time T. With probability e−λT, the value of a call option will be given by Equation 4









The second term of Equation 1 integrates the products of the probability of a de-











T h ee x c h a n g er a t ei nt h i sc a s ei sd i s t r i b u t e da si fi tf o l l o w e dar e g u l a rB r o w n i a nm o t i o n
starting from Se−qT−λkt(1 + k) and with volatility (σ2
1t+σ2
2(T−t))
T . The spot exchange rate
needs to be corrected by the jump (multiplied by (1+k))a n db yt h ed e v a l u a t i o np r e m i u m
up to time t (multiplied by e−λkt). The volatility is just a weighted average of the variances
in the 2 regimes.
24A.2 Theoretical option price under variable λ
Although the model assumes a ﬁxed hazard rate λ, my estimations do not impose this
constraint. This Appendix answers the question of how diﬀerent theoretical option prices
would be if λ were allowed to vary.
Since the answer may depend on the underlying process for λ, I used Monte Carlo
simulations to approximate option prices for a particular case, when the hazard rate λ
behaves according to the following equation:
dlog(λ)=σλ.dX
The table below shows the prices of options with 0.2 year to maturity for diﬀerent σλ’s
but same expected λ after 0.1 year 29.
E(λ|t =0 .10) σλ =0 σλ =0 .5
0.15 3.499 (0.008) 3.487 (0.010)
0.20 4.602 (0.009) 4.600 (0.008)
0.25 5.651 (0.009) 5.664 (0.009)
The lack of sensitivity to σλ is not due to little volatility. If σλ =0 .5 and λ(t =0 )=
0.1975, E(λ|t =0 .10) = 0.20 but the 95% conﬁdence interval for λ(t =0 .20) is wide:
[0.127,0.306] – λ varies signiﬁcantly in the 0.2-year period.
The results show that, at least for this particular case, changes in the standard devia-
tion of the diﬀusion process for λ have no impact on option prices. This example seems
to conﬁrm the intuition that estimates of λ obtained in this work should be close to what
agents perceived as an average hazard rate.
BT h e D a t a
Table 3 shows the data for the last week in October 1997 and the ﬁrst week in November
1997. All information refers to contracts with maturity on the last day of November. The
data contains 695 rows like the 10 presented in Table 3.
The ﬁrst column shows the trading day. Columns 2 to 7 show the prices of options
with strike price shown in the ﬁrst line of the table: for example, on 10/27, options that
give its holder the right to buy US$1000 for BR$1115 were traded at price BR$2.25. F
denotes the future exchange rate: on 10/27, US$1000 on the last day of November were
29Some simpliﬁcations were made to reduce computations cost of this exercise, so all prices are probably slightly overes-
timated. The parameters used were: σ1 = .01,σ2 = .10;k = .20,S=1 0 0 0 ,X=1 1 0 0 ,τ = .20,r= .22,q= .11.
25T a b l e3 :As u b s e to ft h ed a t a
X
Day 1113 1115 1120 1150 1170 1200 FS τ DI
10/27 2.25 2.20 1.40 1.50 1.30 1115.8 1102.7 32 97958
10/28 3.50 3.50 1.40 2.00 2.10 1116.9 1106.4 31 97841
10/29 3.00 4.50 2.00 2.20 1118.2 1102.4 30 97746
10/30 12.00 11.00 12.50 5.00 5.00 5.00 1125.8 1106.3 29 97473
10/31 11.00 7.00 11.00 4.00 4.50 3.30 1124.9 1103.1 28 97056
11/03 7.00 8.00 5.51 4.50 3.00 1121.6 1103.0 25 97123
11/04 5.50 5.50 6.40 3.51 3.49 2.00 1116.9 1104.1 24 97338
11/05 4.30 3.50 3.25 2.60 1.75 2.00 1118.1 1104.1 23 97402
11/06 8.00 7.00 6.00 4.30 2.70 3.00 1118.4 1106.9 22 97541
11/07 13.70 10.50 11.00 7.50 8.00 8.00 1123.5 1108.2 21 97392
priced at BR$1115.80. S is the spot exchange rate: on 10/27, US$1000 cost BR$1102.70.
τ in this table is the number of days until maturity and DI is an interest rate derivative
contract: on 10/27, BR$100,000 on the ﬁrst day of December were worth BR$97,958. The
information on future contracts of interest rate and exchange rate allows us to calculate
interest rates denominated in domestic and foreign currency.
The peg was not abandoned in November 1997, so on the maturity date of those
options, the exchange rate was BR$1109 for US$1000 and all options shown in Table 3
were worth 0.
Option prices show huge daily variations, which suggests that large intra-day ﬂuctua-
tions may also occur. As the data refer to options traded in potentially diﬀerent times,
this may lead to severe measurement error in the dependent variable of Equation 2. In an
extreme example, on 10/31/97, the price of a call with strike 1115 (Reais/US$1000) and
maturity 12/01/97 is 7.00 and a call with strike 1120 and same maturity costs 11.00. The
sum of the absolute measurement error is therefore greater than 4.00! There are plenty
of examples like this, though less dramatic.
The price of a call option must be (weakly) convex as function of the strike price,
otherwise there are arbitrage opportunities (see Campa et al (2002)). Violation of such
properties is evidence of noise in the data on options, probably due to trades being realised
at diﬀerent times, and generate probability density functions with negative values if the
methodology of Campa et al (2002)) is applied. In our sample, convexity is violated in
58% of the 695 days in our sample, and two thirds of those 695 days consist of only 4 or
5p o i n t s .
26T a b l e4 :S p o te x c h a n g er a t ei nJ a n u a r y - 9 9
















C Expected and observed jump size
On 02/01/99, the ﬁrst maturity day of options after the devaluation, the exchange rate
was at 1.983 R$/US$, 63.7% higher than 3 weeks before. According to our estimates,
agents were expecting a substantially smaller jump.30 Actually, this belief is conﬁrmed by
the exchange rate path directly after the devaluation. Table 4 shows the spot exchange
rates in January 1999 – future rates display the same pattern. On January 13th,t h e
e n do ft h ep e g g e dr e g i m ew a sa n n o u n c e da n dt h eC e n t r a lB a n kt r i e dt oi m p o s ean e w
upper bound of ﬂuctuation, at R$1.32/US$.31 Two days later, the new-born band was
abandoned and the exchange rate started to ﬂoat. On the 15th, even though Brazilian
Real had lost this ﬁrst battle, the US Dollar was still just 21% more expensive than before
the jump. The spot rate would go up gradually and increase every single day until the
end of the month.
The behaviour of the exchange rate in the very short run after the devaluation is
interesting: there seems to be a clear and strong upward trend for the price of the US
Dollar, suggesting either that bad news for Brazilian economy was arriving every single
30Malz (1996) estimates the expected devaluation of the Sterling Pound in 1992, conditional on its occurrence, and ﬁnds
that the expected jump was much smaller than the observed depreciation of 12.5%, which suggests that the market was
also surprised by the extent of the Sterling devaluation.
31That would mean a devaluation of around 9%.
27d a yo rt h a tt h em a r k e tt o o kac o u p l eo fw e e k st ou p d a t ei t sm o r eo p t i m i s t i cp r i o r .Al o o k
at the newspapers of January 1999 favours the latter explanation.32
D A simple “sunspot” model
In models with sunspots, switches between equilibria are the main determinants of crises
(Obstfeld (1996), Jeanne (1997)). In the context of this paper, it is instructive to look
at an extreme case of a sunspot model, where the maintenance of the peg is entirely
independent of the currency overvaluation, but depends on some i.i.d. sunspot shocks.
In that case, the probability of a devaluation is unrelated to θ (by assumption): it




As the probability of a devaluation is disconnected from θ, the expected magnitude
of a devaluation conditional on its occurrence at time t is equal to the unconditional
expected value of θ at time t, because conditioning on a currency devaluation yields no
extra information about θ:
E(magnt)=E(θt)




This is an extreme model, but it highlights the fact that a disconnection between θ
and the probability of a devaluation implies a connection between θ and the expected
magnitude of a devaluation.
32For example, the magazine Epoca published on 01/18/99, when the devaluation was already above 20%, brought Finance
Minister Pedro Malan arguing that Brazilian currency overvaluation was slightly lower than 10% – he cited studies from
institutions such as Morgan, Lloyds, IMF and Goldman Sachs that conﬁrmed his opinion. He dismissed the estimations of
an overvaluation of “20%, 25%, 30% and even 40%” as based on some “simplistic calculations”. On that day, 40% sounded
like a bad joke. Reality proved to be diﬀerent.
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